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Jurisdictional Uncertainty: The American Foreign
Trade Zone
by Mark B. Bader*
I. Introduction
Since the days of ancient Greece and Carthage, the free port has
played an important role in international commerce.' As the nations of
the world grow more economically interdependent, and the worldwide
volume of foreign commerce increases, conditions ripen for an expansion
of that role.
The United States entered the field of international free ports with
the passage of the Foreign Trade Zones Act 2 in 1934. This Act and its
subsequent amendments3 represent a congressional attempt to encourage
the use of American labor and facilities in foreign commerce. 4
Although the use of foreign trade zones is on the upswing, 5 their
potential has not yet been fully realized, due largely to businesses' uncer-
tainty regarding jurisdiction over zones and over activities within the
zones. Both the federal government and the states have arguable claims
to jurisdiction over property and activities within zones, and the inability
to predict accurately the application of federal and state authority in a
foreign trade zone diminishes the utility and attractiveness of conducting
business within the zone.
This article focuses on the issue of jurisdiction in a foreign trade
* Assistant Professor of International Business Law, University of Texas at Austin; B.B.A.
University of Miami 1968; J.D. Southern Methodist University 1974.
I R. THOMAS, FREE PORTS AND FOREIGN TRADE ZONES 11-12 (1956). The historical
beginnings of foreign trade zones have been the subject of some debate. Professor Thomas
traces their inauguration to the city-states of the Mediterranean region, while Professor Lomax
argues the free port came into being in 1189 with the exemption of the city of Hamburg from
payment of customs duties on the lower Elbe river. A. LOMAX, THE FOREIGN TRADE ZONE 8
(1947).
2 Foreign Trade Zones Act of 1934, ch. 590, 48 Stat. 998 (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. §§ 81a-81w (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
3 The Foreign Trade Zones Act has been amended twice. In 1950, Congress enacted the
Boggs Amendment, ch. 296, 64 Stat. 246 (1950), to permit manufacturing and exhibition in a
zone. Minor changes were also made by the Foreign Trade Zones Act Amendment of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-271, § 309, 84 Stat. 274, 292 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 81c (1976)).
4 See S. REP. No. 905, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934) [hereinafter cited as SENATE RE-
PORT]; S. REP. No. 713, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1928).
5 The Foreign Trade Zones Board reported the increase of eight new zones or sub-zones
in fiscal 1979, increasing to 47 the number of communities with zones at that time. 41 U.S.
FOREIGN TRADE ZONES BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1979).
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zone. After a brief discussion of the zone concept, procedures within a
zone, and the strengths and weaknesses of the zones, the jurisdiction of
the Foreign Trade Board is examined, as is federal jurisdiction and the
application of federal statutory law, state regulatory jurisdiction, and
most importantly, the question of state and local taxing authority over
zone inventory and activities. It is hoped that a thorough look at juris-
dictional concerns will ease business uncertainty about operation in a
foreign trade zone and pave the way for continued growth in zone
utilization.
II. The Foreign Trade Zone Concept
A. Concept and Procedures
The zone concept itself is a simple one. Congressman Emanuel Cel-
lar, sponsor of the Foreign Trade Zone Act, described a zone as
an isolated, enclosed and policed area in or adjacent to a port of entry,
without a resident population, furnished with the necessary facilities for
lading and unlading, for supplying fuel and ship stores, for storing
goods, and for reshipping them by land and water-an area within
which goods may be landed, stored, mixed, blended, repacked, manufac-
tured, and reshipped without payment of duties and without the inter-
vention of customs officials.
6
The purpose of a free zone is to encourage and expedite foreign
trade by eliminating the payment of customs duties unless and until for-
eign merchandise is imported into U.S. customs territory. By definition,
a zone is not within U.S. customs territory.7 Thus, the payment of cus-
toms duties is deferred until any processing in a zone is completed and
the foreign goods are imported into the United States.8
A foreign trade zone is an enclosed area and must be located at a
port of entry.9 Any foreign or domestic merchandise can be brought into
a zone and there "stored, sold, exhibited, broken up, repacked, assem-
bled, sorted, graded, cleaned, mixed with foreign or domestic merchan-
dise, or otherwise manipulated, or. . .manufactured. . . ,, o Although
the U.S. Customs Service constantly supervises foreign trade zones, the
manipulation and processing of goods in a zone occurs without the ad-
ministrative procedures and customs expenses generally associated with
operations in a U.S. port.
The regulations of the Foreign Trade Zones Board (Board) author-
6 78 CONG. REC. 9853 (1934).
7 19 U.S.C. § 81c (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
8 Id.
9 Id. § 81b(a). Although the term "port" traditionally connoted a seaport, its use today
extends to a varity of situations. In the area of foreign-trade zones, a port of entry denotes one
of the more than 300 Customs ports of entry located in the United States. A broadening of the
scope of the term is attributable to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6, which prohibits legislation
favoring the ports of one state over those of another.
10 19 U.S.C. § 81c (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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ize general purpose foreign trade zones and special purpose sub-zones.I'
The major distinction between a foreign trade zone and a special pur-
pose sub-zone is that a sub-zone is accessible to use by only one firm.' 2 A
qualifying business need not physically relocate to an existing zone. In-
stead, the business simply designates that part of its facilities which will
comprise the sub-zone. Indeed, sub-zones were specifically designed for
companies wishing to utilize the zone concept but unable to relocate to
an existing zone.13 The Board's regulations state that a special purpose
zone or sub-zone may be authorized upon a Board finding that "existing
or authorized zones will not serve adequately the convenience of com-
merce with respect to the proposed purposes. '"14
The application procedures for both foreign trade zones and sub-
zones are similar. Applications to operate a zone may be submitted by
either public or private corporations, depending on applicable state
law. '5 The corporation submits an application to the Board showing the
"location and qualifications of the area in which it is proposed to estab-
lish a zone."' 6 The Board is empowered to grant an application if it
"finds that the proposed plans and location are suitable for the accom-
plishment of the purpose of a foreign trade zone. .... -17 The Board
may also prescribe rules and regulations necessary to establish and con-
duct these zones.' 8 The grantee of the zone becomes, in effect, the lessor
to businesses which use zone facilities. 19
Operation in a foreign trade zone or sub-zone offers several unique
advantages. The most obvious and important advantage is the elimina-
tion of customs duties on goods that enter a zone and are later trans-
shipped or reexported without entering U.S. customs territory. Another
advantage is the opportunity to bring foreign goods into a zone, with
customs duties determined only on finished products imported into the
United States. Customs savings will be significant if the duty on the im-
ported raw material is greater than that on the finished product, and no
customs duties are paid on materials which eventually become waste. In
addition, cash flow is increased through deferral of customs duties on
zone merchandise until importation. Prospective purchasers can ex-
11 15 C.F.R. § 400.304 (1983).
12 Id. See also Armco Steel Corp. v. Stans, 303 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd, 431
F.2d 779, 788-89 (2d Cir. 1970).
13 See Atkins, Doyle & Schwidetzsky, Foreign Trade Zones: Sub-Zones, State Taxation and State
Legislation, 8 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 445, 448 (1979); Da Ponte, Foretgn Trade Zones. An Up-
date, AM. IMPORT & EXPORT BULL., April 1977.
14 15 C.F.R. § 400.304 (1983).
15 See infra notes 63-83 and accompanying text.
16 19 U.S.C. § 81f(a)(1) (1976).
17 Id. § 81g.
18 15 C.F.R. § 400.200(b) (1983). For example, the Board's regulations state that a
grantee of a zone or sub-zone must "maintain the structures and other facilities within the zone
in good condition and so as not to endanger the life and health of the employees of the United
States and others who may be required to enter the zone." 15 C.F.R. § 400.900 (1983).
'9 See A. LOMAX, supra note 1, at 17.
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amine zone goods and place orders, assuring sale prior to payment of
duties. A zone operator is also able to release the goods at the most ad-
vantageous marketing moment. Finally, insurance rates in a zone may
be lower, as the nonpayment of customs duties decreases the insurable
value of a zone operator's goods. 20
One possible disincentive built into the Act is the Board's express
power to prohibit the manufacture or zone processing of any goods "that
in its judgment [are] detrimental to the public's interest, health or
safety."'' z Such reclassification is unlikely to occur, however, as the case
of a Puerto Rican meat packing sub-zone demonstrates. In response to
the creation of the sub-zone, the American Cattleman's Association com-
plained to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) that because
meat produced abroad but packed in the sub-zone did not count against
U.S. meat import quotas, sub-zone packed meat could be used by foreign
meat producers to avoid the U.S. quotas. The USDA responded by
filing with the Board a request that meat packing be declared not in the
public interest when occuring in a zone or sub-zone. Before the Board
could rule on the request, however, the USDA changed its own regula-
tions so that meat produced abroad and packed in a sub-zone counted
against U.S. meat import quotas. This regulation change solved the
problem, and the Board abandoned its investigation of the USDA's com-
plaint. 22 The meat packing episode demonstrates that activities which
are not in the public interest can often be more easily dealt with by the
agency responsible for regulating those activities, wherever they take
place. Hence, the Board's power to prohibit such activities in a zone is
largely redundant.
The foreign trade zone concept is sound. Foreign trade zones pro-
vide many advantages and only one significant disincentive. The appli-
cation procedures are relatively straightforward, and with the veritable
plethora of advantages available through zone operation, it is unclear
why zone utilization, despite the recent increase, remains depressed.
B. Legal Challenges to the Foreign Trade Zone Concept
Despite its historic antecedents, the foreign trade zone concept, as
used in the United States, has been legally challenged. The most serious
challenge was presented in Armco Steel Corp. v. Stans ,23 where Armco
sought a declaratory judgment in federal district court to set aside an
order by the Board which authorized the Commissioners of the Port of
New Orleans to operate a sub-zone. The sub-zone's purpose was to per-
20 See generally Note, Foreign- Trade Zones. "Everything Except the Customs?," 31 U. FLA. L.
REV. 725, 737-39 (1979).
21 19 U.S.C. § 81o(c) (1976).
22 39 U.S. FOREIGN TRADE ZONEs BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 11-12 (1977). The author is
indebted to Marshall Miller, President of the Foreign Trade Association, Kansas City, Kansas,
for directing his attention to this example.
23 431 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1970).
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mit a rival shipbuilder to construct barges with Japanese steel. The high
duty on the Japanese steel could be avoided by bringing the steel into the
sub-zone and exporting the barges. In a full-scale assault on the zone
concept, Armco argued that a zone cannot be used to avoid customs du-
ties if such avoidance results in an unfair competitive advantage over
nonzone operators. Armco further alleged that the sub-zone could not
be operated as a public utility as required, as only one company would
benefit by using the entire sub-zone for its own operations. 24 The district
court rejected these arguments, granting defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment.2 5
In a ringing affirmation of the foreign trade zone and, specifically,
the sub-zone concept, the Second Circuit upheld the district court's deci-
sion.2 6 The court began by recognizing that Congress gave the Board
wide latitude to determine when a zone would aid the domestic econ-
omy. This discretion was not abused when authorizing this particular
sub-zone. 27 This sub-zone was also held not to violate the "equal treat-
ment" requirement of the Act, 28 as the Port of New Orleans had offered
to establish a similar sub-zone for whomever requested one under the
correct conditions. 2
9
The court's most significant action was its dismissal of Armco's im-
plied challenge to the zone concept itself. As the Act was specifically
designed to confer a competitive advantage on zone operators, Armco's
assertion that a sub-zone could not be granted when an operator received
such an advantage struck at the heart of the Act. In response to this
argument, the court held that this "multi-faceted assault on the New
Orleans Foreign Trade Zone (a Sub-Zone) involved arguments of policy
which are better designed for consideration by the Congress than by a
federal court." 30 The Second Circuit upheld the zone concept and
clearly expressed its opinion that any change in that Act's concepts, pur-
poses, or policies must come from Congress rather than the judiciary.
The congressional decision to place foreign trade zones outside the
United States customs territory has also been challenged. In Hawaiian
Independent Refinery v. United States ,3 a refinery located in a sub-zone used
its own imported refined oil to heat distillation equipment. In a dispute
over the nonpayment of duties on the oil used in the sub-zone, plaintiff
argued that this oil never entered customs territory. The Government,
on the other hand, relied on the general rule of dutiability of goods enter-
24 303 F. Supp. 262, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd, 431 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1970).
25 303 F. Supp. at 272.
26 431 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1970).
27 Id at 788.
28 See 19 U.S.C. § 81n (1976), requiring that the zone grantee "afford to all who may
apply for the use of the zone . . .uniform treatment under like conditions ... .
29 431 F.2d at 789.
30 Id. at 784.
31 460 F. Supp. 1249 (Cust. Ct. 1978).
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ing the United States.3 2 The court held for plaintiff, stating that the
Government's general rule applies only to items entering U.S. customs
territory. Congress specifically exempted foreign trade zones from cus-
toms territory in section 3 of the Act.33 The exemption is supported by
the legislative history of the Act and its amendments.3 4 The court's hold-
ing clearly validated the congressional scheme of customs duty exemp-
tion on foreign goods in a zone.
Armco Steel and Hawaitan Independant Refinery demonstrate the legal
strength of the foreign trade zone concept. Indeed, commentators now
seem to have no doubt about the integrity of foreign trade zones. 35 Yet,
the business community remains uncertain as to the utility of these zones.
This uncertainty is focused on the unsettled application of federal and
state laws to zones, and the jurisdictional problems inherent therein.
The jurisdictional problems revolve around three entities: the Foreign
Trade Zone Board, the Federal Government, and state governments.
III. Jurisdiction
A. Foreign Trade Zones Board
The Foreign Trade Zones Board has one of the few clear jurisdic-
tional mandates. The Board's function is to perform the executive roles
necessary to implement the Act. 36 The Board grants to both public and
private corporations the privilege of establishing, operating, and main-
taining zones, and has the power to prescribe such rules and regulations
as it deems necessary to establish and conduct such zones.3 7 The Board
basically coordinates and manages foreign trade zones on a nationwide
basis.
Despite the seemingly clear legislative delegation of power to the
Board, the Board's jurisdiction has not gone unchallenged. One such
challenge was presented in Oklahoma ex rel. Blakenship v. South ,38 where the
plaintiff requested a declaratory judgment and injunction to halt pro-
ceedings before the Board and the Secretary of the Interior. The pro-
ceedings contemplated the establishment of an oil refining sub-zone.
Plaintiff's principal allegation was lack of jurisdiction in the Board and
32 This rule states that all articles imported into the United States are subject to a tax (a
duty) if the tariff schedule so specifies. See 19 U.S.C. § 1202(1) (1976).
33 See 19 U.S.C. § 81c (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
34 See S. REP. No. 1107, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1949), reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2533. See also 78 CONG. REc. 9853 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Celler); 78 CONG. REC.
9763 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Welch).
35 Commentators have universally agreed on the integrity of foreign trade zones. Schol-
arly research has dealt primarily with business, and to a lesser extent legal, problems inherent in
zone operation. See, e.g., Atkins, Doyle & Schwidetzsky, supra note 13; Landry & McGinnis,
Foreign Trade Zones in Florida- Legal Considerations for Foreign Business Interest, 10 LAW. AM. 41
(1978); Note, supra note 20.
36 19 U.S.C. § 81h (1976). See 15 C.F.R. § 400.200 (1983).
37 19 U.S.C. §§ 81b(a), 81h (1976). See 15 C.F.R. § 400.200(b) (1983).
38 312 F. Supp. 770 (W.D. Okla. 1970).
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in the Secretary to entertain the applications before them.3 9
The court disagreed with plaintiffs contentions and granted defend-
ants' motion to dismiss.4° The court found that Congress had clearly
delegated to each defendant jurisdiction to examine the applications. 4'
Delegation ofjurisdiction to the Board seems clear from the words of the
Act granting wide discretion to the Board to hear such applications.
42
The Blakenship decision squarely confirms the power of the Board to hear
controversies concerning zone applications in accordance with the con-
gressional scheme.
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Smith 43 raised a similar challenge to the Board's
jurisdiction. In Sinclair, the plaintiff claimed that the Secretary of the
Interior and the Board were exceeding their constitutional and statutory
authority in entertaining an application for an oil refining sub-zone.
Plaintiff's main argument against the Board's jurisdiction was founded
on a notion that the Board lacked jurisdiction to create a sub-zone which
was "an integral part of a plan to obtain an oil import license which the
Secretary lacks power to grant."
4 4
The District Court for the Southern District of New York refused to
intervene in the on-going administrative proceeding. 45 The court held
that the Secretary of the Interior clearly had the power to consider oil
import license requests, and that Occidental Petroleum had properly ap-
plied for a license. The argument of lack of jurisdiction of the Board was
derivatively based on a claim of a lack of jurisdiction of the Secretary.
As the Secretary had jurisdiction, the assertion that the Board did not
falls of its own weight. The court deemed the question of Board jurisdic-
tion unworthy of extended discussion, as the Board clearly had the power
to entertain zone applications before it.
As illustrated by the cases, the jurisdiction of the Board is solidly
established. Assuming certain threshold criteria are met,46 the Board has
the power to act on zone applications and, in general, to supervise and
administer the national foreign trade zone structure. 4 7 There should be
no uncertainty in the business community as to the effect of Board ac-
tions. In conjunction with the previous cases upholding the zone con-
cept, any potential zone applicant apparently can rely on the application
and administrative procedures embodied in the Foreign Trade Zones
Act.
39 Id. at 771.
40 Id. at 771-72.
41 Id. at 771. The court based this finding on "an examination of the applicable laws,"
citing Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Smith, 293 F. Supp. Ii I (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
42 See 19 U.S.C. § 81b (1976).
43 293 F. Supp. 1111 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
44 Id. at 1114.
45 Id. at 1115.
46 See 19 U.S.C. § 8ff (1976); 15 C.F.R. §§ 400.600-.609 (1983).
47 19 U.S.C. § 8If (1976).
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B. FederalJurisdictlon
The Foreign Trade Zones Act does not empower a particular body
to decide legal disputes arising from zone operations. Such disputes are
left to be heard by the judiciary. Hence, a serious question arises as to
what disputes are appropriate for federal courts, and what powers, if any,
the several states have over zone operations.
The threshold issue is whether a foreign trade zone is subject to ex-
clusive federal jurisdiction as a "federal enclave." The issue was first
raised in American Dock Co. v. City of New York.48 American Dock involved a
taxpayer's action to invalidate a zone operating contract between the
City of New York and a private corporation. The New York State court
held, inter a/ia, that neither the Foreign Trade Zones Board nor the
United States was a necessary party to the action. While the issue of
federal versus state jurisdiction was not explicitly discussed, the court
held that the resolution of the case did not involve any right or interest of
the United States, eliminating the need for the Board as a party. 49 The
state court reached the merits of the case, suggesting zones may be sub-
ject to state jurisdiction and are not "federal enclaves" subject to exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction. 50
A more explicit rejection of the "federal enclave" theory occurred in
Fountain v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. 51 Plaintiff brought a wrongful
death action in federal court with the only possible basis for federal juris-
diction being that the accident ocurred in a foreign trade zone. The
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. The court prefaced its holding by noting
that the Foreign Trade Zones Act by its terms does not confer federal
jurisdiction. 52 The court also held that the suit did not deal directly with
the construction of federal law, as neither the Constitution nor the rights
of the United States were involved. Thus, no federal question was prop-
erly before the court. 53
Fountain and American Dock appear to reject the idea that a zone is a
"federal enclave" for jurisdictional purposes. On the other hand, suits
involving questions of federal law in zones remain within the scope of
federal jurisdiction. The legislative history of the Act strongly supports
continued federal jurisdiction over federal question lawsuits arising
within the zones. In response to concerns about zone operations Con-
gressman Cellar said, "[A foreign trade zone] is subject...to all the laws
relating to public health, vessel inspection, postal service, labor condi-
48 174 Misc. 813, 21 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup. Ct. 1940), a.fdper curnam, 261 A.D. 1065, 26
N.Y.S.2d 704, aft'dper curim, 286 N.Y. 658, 36 N.E.2d 696 (1941).
49 Id. at 817-18, 21 N.Y.S.2d at 950-51.
50 Id.
51 387 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1967).
52 Id. at 344.
53 Id.
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tions, immigration, and indeed everything except the customs." '54 One
can readily infer an intent on the part of the bill's sponsor, speaking in
Congress, to continue the reach of federal law in foreign trade zones, and
subsequent federal court decisions support the inference.
The application of federal patent laws to zone operations was ex-
amined in GD. Searle & Co. v. Byron Chemical Co. , which involved. a
patent dispute in which the defendant Byron admitted the validity of the
plaintiff Searle's patent. Byron had bought the patented drug from a
German company which shipped it to a foreign trade zone in New York.
Byron subsequently placed the drug aboard a carrier for shipment to
Japan. When Searle sued on the patent, defendant Byron argued that
the transaction had occurred totally in foreign commerce and therefore
was outside the reach of U.S. patent laws. Relying in part on the legisla-
tive history of the Foreign Trade Zones Act, the court rejected defend-
ant's contentions and found applicable jurisdiction.56 The court held
that federal laws regulating business activity, including the U.S. patent
law, apply with full force in a zone.
The Searle decision followed the previously decided but unreported
case of American Cynamid Co. v. Boione. 57 The defendant in American
Cynamid had agreed to a decree enjoining further infringement on plain-
tiffs patent on the drug sulfadiozone. In an attempt to avoid the consent
decree, the defendant imported sulfadiozone into a foreign trade zone for
transshipment to foreign countries. The court held the defendant in con-
tempt of the previous decree, further supporting the application of U.S.
patent laws in a zone.
The Lanham Trademark Act 58 has also been held to apply in a
zone. In A. T Cross Co. v. Sunil Trading Corp.,59 Sunil imported bogus
Cross pens into a zone with the intention to transship them for sale in the
Canary Islands. By bringing the pens into a zone, Sunil could avoid
customs duties and legally stamp the pens "Made in U.S.A.," increasing
their resemblance to legitimate Cross pens. In a federal trademark ac-
tion brought by Cross, Sunil asserted lack of subject matter jurisdiction
as a defense.6°
The court rejected Sunil's argument and found jurisdiction over the
cause of action, granting Cross's request for a preliminary injunction.
The court construed congressional intent to render the Lanham Act's
jurisdictional predicates coextensive with those of the Commerce
Clause.6 1 As such, the Act would reach not only interstate commerce but
54 78 CONG. REC. 9853 (1934).
55 223 F. Supp. 172 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
56 Id. at 174.
57 No. 992-60 (C.D.N.J. April 18, 1962).
58 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
59 467 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
60 Id. at 48-49.
61 Id. at 51. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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also foreign commerce. In construing the jurisdictional provisions of the
Foreign Trade Zones Act, the court made the following analysis:
There is absolutely no indication in the Foreign Trade Zones Act
that Congress ever intended to exclude goods therein from regulation
under United States laws by the Federal Courts. Indeed, the totality of
the evidence indicates the contrary ....
Consequently, since the Commerce Clause extends into the foreign
trade zone, and the jurisdictional reach of the Lanham Act is coexten-
sive therewith, the only possible conclusion is that, absent an express
repudiation of federal jurisdiction (which is not contained in the Foreign
Trade Zone Act), the jurisdictional parameters of the Lanham Act reach
within the foreign trade zone.
62
The idea that federal acts with jurisdictional parameters coextensive
with the Commerce Clause reach into foreign trade zones was previously
applied in United States v. Yaron Laboratories, Inc. 63 In Yaron, the Food and
Drug Administration's (FDA) admininstrative powers were at issue.
Yaron Labs processed raw materials from Italy into the drug PAX in a
foreign trade zone, and reexported the drug. PAX had neither been filed
with, nor approved by, the FDA. 64 Upon examination of the FDA's en-
abling legislation, the court held that federal jurisdiction in a zone ex-
isted under the Pure Food and Drug Act.65 The court found that the
jurisdiction conferred was coextensive with the congressional power
under the Commerce Clause and, therefore, extended to both interstate
and foreign commerce.66
The lack of a jurisdictional predicate fully coextensive with the
Commerce Clause was fatal to the government's case in United States v.
Prock.67 Prior to the effective date of Texas anti-gaming laws, defendant
sent slot machines from Texas to a foreign trade zone in New Orleans.
Federal authorities arrested him on a charge of violating the federal law
prohibiting interstate shipment of gaming devices. 68
At trial, the district court sustained the defendant's motion for ac-
quittal, noting that the statute prohibited only interstate transport of
gaming machines. The market was not in interstate commerce, but in
foreign commerce, as the slot machines went to a foreign trade zone.
The court held that only transfer from a place in one state to a place in
another state or in the District of Columbia qualifies as interstate trans-
portation. 69 The Prock opinion suggests that a zone is not a "place in
another State," but a foreign outpost for the purposes of the law regulat-
ing interstate commerce. More importantly, the opinion demonstrates
62 Sunil, 467 F. Supp. at 51.
63 365 F. Supp. 917 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
64 Id. at 919.
65 See 21 U.S.C. § 332(a) (1976).
66 Yaron, 365 F. Supp. at 919-20.
67 105 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1952).
68 Id. at 264. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171, 1175 (1976).
69 arock, 105 F. Supp. at 264.
FOREIGN TRADE ZONES 249
that an act which regulates only interstate commerce does not apply in a
foreign trade zone.
The preceding decisions illustrate a dichotomy in the applicability
of federal acts to zone operations. Those acts providing for jurisdiction
over foreign commerce apply in foreign trade zones, and those where
jurisdiction is limited to interstate commerce do not apply. Acts which
regulate business activity regardless of whether the market is in interstate
or foreign commerce, and acts which regulate activities regardless of the
commercial output will operate in zones. Those acts which are limited to
regulation or prohibition of actions solely in interstate commerce proba-
bly do not apply in foreign trade zones.
This dichotomy is in harmony with the purposes behind foreign
trade zones. A major reason for the existence of zones is to encourage the
use of American facilities in the reexport and transshipment of trade.
70
Clearly, this trade is almost exclusively in foreign commerce. To regulate
such commerce by laws aimed at domestic interstate commerce would
weaken the incentives provided by the Act. Trade between a domestic
point and a foreign trade zone should also be considered not to be in
interstate commerce for jurisdictional purposes. A zone, in many cases,
merely acts as a stopping-off point for goods to be exported from a do-
mestic point. Congress intended to encourage such zone utilization
through the Act, in order to increase the use of American facilities and
labor. Subjecting goods transferred to a zone to all laws regulating in-
terstate commerce would restrain such zone use and weaken the Act's
potential. A foreign trade zone is designed to encourage business entities
engaged in foreign commerce. 7 1 In consonance with that design, only
federal laws reaching foreign commerce should reach foreign trade zones.
The idea that foreign trade zone activities are part of foreign com-
merce has also been used offensively to give rise to federal jurisdiction
over traditional state functions in limited circumstances. In United States
V. Yoppolo,72 defendants appealed their conviction for theft of scotch
which was being transported from Glasgow, Scotland to Cincinnati. The
scotch was stolen from a trader in a Toledo, Ohio foreign trade zone. On
appeal, the defendants argued that their convictions in federal district
court were invalid due to a lack of jurisdiction. 73 The Sixth Circuit dis-
agreed, finding federal jurisdiction as the goods were still moving in for-
eign commerce. The goods thus were still subject to federal regulation
exclusively, and federal courts had the power to enforce criminal
sanctions. 14
The Yoppolo holding appears to establish a basis for federal jurisdic-
70 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4.
71 See id. at 1.
72 435 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1970).
73 Id. at 626.
74 Id.
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tion whenever merchandise is stolen from a foreign trade zone. As the
previous decisions dealing with the reach of federal acts into zones make
clear, zone activities are considered to be in foreign commerce. There-
fore, theft of merchandise from a zone would appear to be the theft of
goods in foreign commerce.
A look at the jurisdictional parameters of specific federal statutes
should give a relatively clear picture of which statutes apply in foreign
trade zones. For example, given the jurisdictional rationale behind the
earlier cases, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)75 should apply
in foreign trade zones. Because the NLRA applies to corporations acting
in foreign commerce, 76 it probably grants federal jurisdiction over labor
matters arising in zones.
A foreign trade zone operator should be able to determine which
statutes apply to zone operations. The jurisdictional reach of federal
statutes eliminates the possibility of conducting activities in a zone which
generally would be prohibited under federal law.77 A zone operator,
however, is probably not subject to federal acts which regulate only in-
terstate commerce. This dichotomy, although somewhat cumbersome,
adds predictability to zone operation and, by doing so, should reduce
some of the present business uncertainty about zone usage.
C State Jurisdiction
With the rejection of a foreign trade zone as a "federal enclave,"
zones became subject to concurrent state and federal jurisdiction. The
limits of state jurisdiction are somewhat unclear. Indeed, one of the basic
uncertainties about zone operations involves the question of state power
in zones. Certain basic parameters can be discerned, however.
In During v. Valente, 78 a New York court held that a state does not
have the power to regulate commercial activity in a foreign trade zone.
Valente, a breach of contract action, is the only reported decision on this
issue. In Valente the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had employed
and authorized him to sell foreign liquor stored in a zone, and that the
plaintiff had procured a buyer. The defendant, however, refused to
carry out the sale.79 At trial, the court upheld the defendant's motion to
dismiss on the grounds that the complaint failed to allege plaintiff had a
solicitor's permit as required by New York alcoholic beverage laws.
8 0
The New York appellate court reversed the lower court ruling and
75 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
76 Id. § 152(6) (1976).
77 For example, a zone could not be used to evade the requirements of federal securities
laws, because the jurisdictional reach of these laws is coextensive with the Commerce Clause.
See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 2(7), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(7) (1976).
78 267 A.D. 383, 46 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1944).
79 Id. at -, 46 N.Y.S.2d at 386-87.
80 During v. Valente, __ Misc. -, 42 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1943). See N.Y. ALCo. BEV. CONT.
LAW § 93 (McKinney 1970).
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held for plaintiff. The court observed that a local zone was established
through the exclusive and plenary power of Congress to regulate com-
merce with foreign nations. Imposition of a complicated set of state li-
quor regulations was held not only to interfere with the exclusive control
of Congress over foreign commerce, but also to seriously impair, if not
defeat, the purposes for which trade zones were established. Mere impor-
tation and geographical location of the goods within New York State in a
zone was held not to constitute importation into the state. The sale of
the goods was therefore not subject to state regulation.,"
In the years since the Valente decision, no court has questioned its
holding. Indeed, Valente is regularly cited for the proposition that foreign
trade zones were created through the plenary power of Congress over
foreign commerce.8 2 Therefore, it seems well-established that state regu-
latory encroachment into zones would be impermissable as an attempt to
regulate foreign commerce. State regulation would also defeat the pur-
poses of foreign trade zones. Companies involved in reexport and trans-
shipment activities would be severely shackled if forced to comply with
the state regulations, and the encouragement of the use of American la-
bor and facilities in foreign commerce intended through zone authoriza-
tions would be severely hampered if such zones were subject to the
vagaries of local regulation.
State legislation does directly affect applications for foreign trade
zone operations. The Foreign Trade Zones Act delineates certain limited
situations where an act of the state legislature is required before the
Board can accept an application.8 3 Further, the Act states that a zone
may be operated by a public or private corporation, 4 with preference
given to public corporations.8 5 States play an integral role in the process
by defining public corporations, and by designating which public and
private corporations are authorized to make a zone application. States
designate appropriate applicants in a variety of ways; most often by spec-
ifying which public corporations may apply.
State definitions of a "public corporation" vary greatly, with some
state definitions as broad as that in the Act itself.8 6 Others define "pub-
81 Valente, 267 A.D. at __, 46 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
82 See, e.g., A.T. Cross Co. v. Sunil Trading Corp., 467 F. Supp. 47, 50-51 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
83 See 19 U.S.C. § 81b(d) (1976). State legislation is required whenever a state contains
two types of ports of entry, one where harbor facilities are controlled by the state and the other
with facilities controlled by a municipality. This provision evidently was intended to deny
states an advantage over municipalities. While a state could make an application for a zone at
its port of entry at once, a municipality might be forced to approach the state legislature for
bonding authority. This section puts both entities on the same time footing by requiring a state
legislative act. This issue is beyond the jurisdictional purview of our present discussion, and will
not be discussed further. For an in-depth look at this provision and the situations where state
legislative action is required see Atkins, Doyle & Schwidetzsky, supra note 13.
84 19 U.S.C. §§ 81a(d), 81b(c) (1976).
85 Id. § 81b(c).
86 Id. § 81a(e).
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lic corporation" in terms of a particular government entity. The Vir-
ginia foreign trade zone statute illustrates the former, less restricted
definition:
The term "public corporation" for the purposes of this chapter, means
the State of Virginia or any political subdivision thereof or any incorpo-
rated municipality therein or any public agency of this State or of any
political subdivision thereof or of any municipality therein, or any cor-
porate municipal instrumentality of this State or of the State and one or
more States.
87
The Louisiana foreign trade zone statute is typical of a more restrictive
definition of a public corporation for zone application purposes, stating:
"The [Board of Commissioners of the Port Districts] may make applica-
tion to the Secretary of Commerce for the purpose of establishing, open-
ing and maintaining foreign trade zones .. *"88 Michigan uses the
presence or absence of public funding as the criterion for determining
which public entities may apply.8 9
Many states also define those private corporations which may apply
for a zone grant. Statutes range from total exclusion of private appli-
cants to statutes allowing almost any private corporation to apply. An
example of the exclusionary approach is that of Hawaii. 90 Considering
the Act's specific preference for public corporations, 9 1 this approach may
appear more realistic. Given the time and political constraints on state
and local governments, however, more efficient use of the zone concept
could come from private corporations. A public corporation operating
in a zone may compete for funds with other governmental entities, such
as school districts, thereby hampering efficient operation of the zone. Al-
though the Act requires a private corporation operating a zone to oper-
ate as a public utility,92 the profit motive could easily act as an impetus
to use the zone and encourage more efficient business practices in zone
administration.
Some states have recognized the problem of governmental inertia
and allow private corporations to apply. Many states authorize private
corporations expressly organized for zone operation. For example, the
New Jersey statute states: "Corporations may be organized in this State
for the purpose of establishing, operating and maintaining foreign trade
87 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-159 (1982). California also defines "public corporation" in the
broadest possible terms. See CAL. Gov'r CODE § 6300 (West 1980).
88 LA. REV. STAT. § 51:62 (Supp. 1983).
89 The Michigan statute reads, in pertinent part: " 'Public corporation' means the state, or
any county, township, city or village within the state, or any State or municipal authority or
similar organization financed in whole or part by public funds." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 21.302(l)(b) (1967).
90 See HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 212-2 to -3 (1976). Section 212-2 defines a "public corpora-
tion" as "the state of Hawaii, any political subdivision thereof, and municipality therein, or any
public agency of the state." Section 212-3 limits applicants for foreign trade zones to "any
public corporation which is duly designated and approved by the governor."
91 19 U.S.C. § 81b(c) (1976).
92 Id. § 81n (1976).
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zones. . . . 93 Georgia has a similar provision. 94 These statutes allow
for private operation, but are not as helpful as possible. By requiring the
establishment of a separate corporation for zone operation, the element
of governmental inertia is reinstituted.
Still other states have adopted a broader approach and allow basi-
cally all private corporations to apply for zone status. A typical statute is
that of Delaware, which provides: "All public and private corporations
shall have the power to apply to the proper authorities of the United
States government for a grant, and when such a grant is issued, to estab-
lish and operate foreign trade zones. . . . 95 Arizona embraces this ap-
proach and also provides that public and private corporations may
combine to operate a zone. 96 By allowing free private access to the zone,
these states have encouraged utilization of the zone concept. Some
would argue that this approach goes too far, as private corporations
would have no incentive to operate in the public interest.
As a compromise system, a state could provide by statute for a con-
tractual relation whereby a public corporation acts as a grantee and con-
tracts with a private corporation to operate a zone at the latter's expense.
While the Act clearly states that "the grant shall not be sold, conveyed,
transferred, set over nor assigned,"'97 the early case of American Dock Co. v.
City of New York 98 acknowledged the validity of such a contractual rela-
tion. The Washington State statutory scheme uses this compromise
approach:
A city or town, as a zone sponsor, may apply to the United States for
permission to establish, operate and maintain foreign trade zones: Pto-
vided, that nothing herewith shall be construed to prevent these zones
from being operated and financed by private corporation(s) on behalf of
a city or town as zone sponsor.
99
The compromise approach appears to be the most efficient. It com-
bines the business expertise and profit motive of a private corporation
with the public concern of a governmental entity. While the approach
does not eliminate the problem of government inertia, the added pres-
ence of a private organization urging governmental action could lessen
the problem. By using a contractual relationship between a public cor-
poration grantee and a private corporation operator, a foreign trade zone
can be operated more efficiently, and with an eye toward protecting the
public interest.
For a business interested in operating and maintaining a foreign
trade zone, a statutory scheme allowing private zone operation can rep-
93 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12:13-3 (West 1979).
94 GA. STAT. ANN. § 52-10-3 (1981).
95 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7502 (West Supp. 1982).
96 See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-6501 (West Supp. 1982).
97 19 U.S.C. § 8 1g (1976).
98 174 Misc. 813, 21 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1940),af'dpercuriam, 261 A.D. 1065, 26 N.Y.S.2d 704,
affdper curtam, 286 N.Y. 658, 36 N.E.2d 696 (1941).
99 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.21.850 (Supp. 1983).
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resent a profitable opportunity. Private management could also be bene-
ficial to the affected state, by lessening the problem of governmental
inertia in the initial zone organization, and by providing greater flex-
ibility to deal with changing business conditions. In turn, better man-
agement could encourage greater zone usage to the ultimate benefit of
the state through greater utilization of its facilities and labor force.
To a business which seeks only to operate within a zone, state juris-
diction should provide little uncertainty. An operator would not be sub-
ject to state regulatory schemes, particularly regulations for licensing
zone applicants. While the full limits of state jurisdiction are unclear,
the lack of regulatory jurisdiction provides a boon. Operation in a for-
eign trade zone adds no state regulation and may result in avoiding state
regulation in significant areas.
IV. Taxation
The most significant unsettled issue of state and federal jurisdiction
over foreign trade zones is that of the validity of state ad valorem personal
property taxation of zone merchandise. The existence of state and local
taxation of zone goods could provide a powerful disincentive to a busi-
nessman wishing to begin zone operation. At this time no clear answer
exists as to the validity of such taxation, but recent decisions have opened
up this area for comment.
A recent set of cases dealt with the issue of state taxation over im-
ports, although not in the context of a foreign trade zone. The Supreme
Court considered this issue in Micheh'n Tire Corp. v. Wages, 00 where state
ad valorem personal property taxes were assessed against Michelin by a
county in Georgia on tires imported from France and Nova Scotia.
Michelin brought a federal action seeking to have the tax invalidated as
an "impost or duty" in violation of the Import/Export Clause of the
United States Constitution. 101
The Supreme Court ruled that a nondiscriminatory advalorem prop-
erty tax is not prohibited as an unconstitutional impost or duty. The
Court held that such property taxes are the method by which states ap-
portion the cost of services among beneficiaries according to respective
wealth, and that no reason exists to accord imported goods preferential
treatment. The Court went on to state:
It is obvious that such nondiscriminatory property taxation can have no
impact whatsoever on the Federal Government's exclusive regulation of
foreign commerce, probably the most important purpose of the [Im-
port/Export] Clause's prohibition. By definition, such a tax does not fall
on imports as such because of their place of origin. It cannot be used to
create special protective tariffs or particular preferences for certain do-
mestic goods, and it cannot be applied selectively to encourage or dis-
courage any importation in a manner inconsistent with federal
M 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
101 Id. at 278-79. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
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regulation. 1
0 2
The Court in Michehn has shifted the focus of judicial analysis con-
cerning the validity of state and local taxes on imported goods to the
question of whether the tax in question discriminates based on the for-
eign origin of the goods, regardless of the status of the goods as imports.
The Court seems to be indicating that a state or local tax on imported
goods is permissible if nondiscriminatory. Should the rationale apply to
foreign trade zones, a nondiscriminatory ad valorem personal property tax
would appear permissible.
The Michelin approach was applied in Zee Toys, Inc. v. County of Los
Angeles, 10 3 which dealt with imported goods in warehouses in much the
same fact situation as in Michein. The county had taxed plaintiff's goods
which were manufactured outside the United States. Plaintiff taxpayer
filed for a tax exemption under California statutes exempting goods
brought through the state and transshipped outside the state. 10 4 The
California court struck down this tax exemption, holding that selective
exemption of foreign goods gives them a competitive advantage over in-
trastate goods. Such an exemption would be a regulation of interstate
foreign commerce and thus a violation of the Import/Export Clause.
The court went on to say that goods manufactured in a foreign country
and imported are subject to ad valorem taxes under like conditions as in-
terstate goods and tax discrimination is impermissable. 10 5
The point had also been raised in American Smelting and Refining Co. v.
County of Contra Costa 10 6 in which the county assessed taxes against goods
held in a bonded warehouse, a duty-free enclave. 10 7 The California
Court of Appeals upheld the tax, saying congressional intent in authoriz-
ing bonded warehouses was to relieve the processor only of customs du-
ties until goods enter United States customs territory, not to grant an
exemption from state and local taxation. The case is of little value, how-
ever, when evaluating state taxation of goods in a foreign trade zone.
The court specifically held the law regarding zones was not controlling
and suggested the Foreign Trade Zones Act was a "broader statute" than
the statute authorizing bonded warehouses.10 8
In reliance on these cases, proponents have argued that nondiscrimi-
natory taxation of zone merchandise is permissible.10 9 However, it is im-
102 Michelin, 423 U.S. at 286.
103 85 Cal. App. 3d 763, 149 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1978), affd sub nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
County of Los Angeles, 449 U.S. 1119 (1981).
104 Zee Toys, 85 Cal. App. 3d at 767-769, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 752-54.
105 Id. at 772-77, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 756-59.
106 271 Cal. App. 2d 437, 77 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 273 (1970).
107 See generally 14 U.S.C. § 1555 (1976) (authorizing bonded warehouses).
108 American Smelling, 271 Cal. App. at -, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
109 See, e.g., Note, North Carohna Foretgn- Trade Zones: Problems & Perspectives, 5 N.C.J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 521, 525-28 (1980). Because nontaxation of zone merchandise gives imported
goods a competitive advantage over domestic goods, state refusal to tax zone merchandise could
arguably be unconstitutional as an infringement upon Congress' sole authority to regulate for-
eign commerce. See U.S. CONST., art. I. § 8, cl. 3; Note, supra, at 526-28.
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portant to note that none of the cases dealt with goods in a foreign trade
zone. It is difficult to conceive of a state personal property tax which
would not be discriminatory towards the foreign origin of zone goods.
Most zone goods would not be within the physical boundaries of a state
were it not for the existence of a foreign trade zone. This is particularly
true of goods in the transshipment and reexport trade. To levy state and
local personal property taxes against such goods would be to levy taxes
on goods due to their foreign origin, and could not be termed
nondiscriminatory.
Also, the previously mentioned cases did not deal with the usual
zone situation of goods in foreign commerce. In all of the cases, the
taxed goods had come to rest in a particular state and were destined for
interstate commerce. As discussed earlier, federal statutes regulating
only interstate commerce do not generally apply to zone activities. o10 In
Michelin the state tax was held applicable to imported goods which were
destined for interstate commerce. The distinction between interstate and
foreign commerce weakens the precedential effect of Michehn where zone
merchandise is involved.
A stronger argument for the lack of state tax jurisdiction in foreign
trade zones revolves around the Commerce Clause."II If goods in a for-
eign trade zone are in foreign commerce, state taxation may conflict with
the plenary power of Congress over foreign commerce, and hence may be
unconstitutional. The Import/Export Clause and the Commerce Clause
are not coterminous in scope,' 12 and taxation which does not violate the
former could violate the latter. Thus, even if the Import/Export Clause
does not bar state and local taxation after Micheh'n,"13 the Commerce
Clause could still prohibit such taxation.
The Commerce Clause was raised against state taxation in McGoldrik
v. Gulf Oil Corp. ,14 in which the state of New York attempted to impose
taxes on fuel oil in a bonded warehouse. Gulf imported the oil from
foreign sources and sold it to ships for consumption as fuel in foreign
commerce.'" 5 The Supreme Court held the tax violated the Commerce
Clause. By authorizing bonded warehouses, Congress was held to have
intended to confer a competitive advantage for those using such ware-
houses in foreign commerce. The question then became whether the tax
conflicted with this congressional policy. The Court held that it was evi-
l t0 See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
I U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
l12 See Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946). The Court
here explained that the invalidity of a state tax under the Import/Export Clause derives from
the prohibition of state taxes on imports or exports, while the invalidity of a state tax under the
Commerce Clause does not turn on whether the article taxed was or ever has been an import or
export. The Court further noted that the Commerce Clause is not cast as a tax prohibition, but
rather as a power on the part of Congress to regulate commerce.
''3 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
'14 309 U.S. 414 (1940).
1 15 Id. at 422.
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dent this purpose would fail if the states were free, at any stage of the
transaction, to impose a tax which would lessen this competitive advan-
tage. The congressional regulation, read in light of its purpose, was held
tantamount to a declaration that this oil was not to become part of the
common mass of taxable property within the state, and therefore was not
subject to state taxation.'" 6 The state tax thus had to fail as an infringe-
ment on congressional regulation of commerce. While McGoldrick dealt
only with goods intended for reexport, the previously discussed deci-
sion in During v. Valente t IT considered all zone goods part of foreign
commerce.
Taken together, these decisions stand loosely for the proposition that
state or local taxation must fail if it thwarts a legislatively expressed con-
gressional policy regarding commerce. The Foreign Trade Zones Act
represents such a policy. The Act is designed to encourage the use of
American labor and facilities in foreign commerce, an area exclusively
reserved to Congress. To allow state and local taxation of zone merchan-
dise would thwart this objective by raising costs to business, whether the
zone goods are destined for reexport or for eventual importation. Con-
gress certainly could have distinguished between these two categories of
merchandise when enacting the Foreign Trade Zones Act, but chose not
to do so, which suggests that Congress sought to encourage foreign com-
merce in zones regardless of the ultimate destination of the goods. By
authorizing zones, Congress expressed a clear policy in favor of certain
foreign commerce.
State taxation also conflicts with the desire of Congress to simplify
matters through the Foreign Trade Zones Act." 8 Bonded warehouses
and drawback provisions,119 providing the same duty-free status as
zones, never received great usage due to their complexity. Recognizing
the failure of these provisions, Congress adopted the new simpler format
of foreign trade zones. State taxation would complicate zone usage, both
in terms of accounting and in terms of the varying taxation of the several
states.
North Carolina has exempted foreign trade zones from ad valorem
personal property taxation by amending the 1975 Act authorizing the
establishment of foreign trade zones in the state.120 The amendment ac-
complished two desirable ends. First, it made North Carolina foreign
116 Id. at 429.
117 267 A.D. 383, 46 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1944). See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
118 The complexity of the drawback system and the bonded warehouse were major factors
in the passage of the Act. See 78 CONG. REC. 9853 (1934) (remarks by Rep. Celler discussing the
"irksome provisions" of using a bonded warehouse).
119 Drawback provisions allow the reimbursement of up to 94% of customs duties paid on
goods reexported or transshipped in foreign commerce. See 19 U.S.C. § 1313 (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
120 See Act of June 28, 1977, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 782 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 55C-4, 105-275(23) (1982)) (amending North Carolina Foreign Trade Zone Act, 1975 N.C.
Sess. Laws 983 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55C-1 to -4 (1982)).
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trade zones more attractive to business through relief from personal
property taxes.'21 Second, the amendment removed a major point of un-
certainty for prospective zone operators, 12 2 thus eliminating one of the
main causes for companies foregoing zone operation. North Carolina has
led the way in this area.
There has been no clear, judicial expression on the issue of the valid-
ity of state and local taxation of merchandise held in a foreign trade
zone. Such taxation is arguably no longer prohibited by the Im-
port/Export Clause after Miheln. However, such a result is not man-
dated by Micheln and significant distinctions exist between the Micheln
situation and foreign trade zones. In any event, the Commerce Clause
looms as a serious obstacle to state and local taxation of zone goods. If
the Foreign Trade Zones Act is held to reflect a congressional policy re-
garding foreign commerce, state taxation would conflict with this policy.
As a hindrance to a legislatively expressed congressional policy, state tax-
ation would be considered unconstitutional. Persuasive policy reasons
also exist in opposition to the imposition of ad valorem personal property
taxes.
The best way to alleviate the uncertainty surrounding the taxation
issue is for states to follow the lead of North Carolina and expressly evi-
dence an intent not to assess ad valorem taxes against zone merchandise.
In this era of tightening state budgets, such a move could be politically
unpopular. However, by eschewing this taxation, states would en-
courage zone usage and possibly increase employment and tax revenues
from zone employees' wages and personal expenditures. The purposes of
the Foreign Trade Zones Act also would thus be encouraged.
V. Conclusion
A modicum of uncertainty about jurisdiction in a foreign trade zone
remains. The uncertainty is minor, however, when compared with the
advantages gained by operation in a zone. Zone usage is on the increase
and deservedly so. Few other business locations offer the advantages in-
herent in a foreign trade zone, particularly to a businessman involved in
the export-import trade, or one manufacturing from imported raw
materials. With some semblance of order to the jurisdictional issues sur-
rounding foreign trade zones, zone usage should increase, leading to a
fuller utilization of the zone concept.
121 See Note, supra note 109, at 526.
122 Id The amendment removed the constitutional cloud surrounding the original act by
exempting zone merchandise from personal property taxes, thus avoiding the question whether
zone merchandise could constitutionally be subject to the tax. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-
273(23) (1982).
